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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 12-2877 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
THOMAS DAVID WINEBARGER, 
                                                Appellant 
 
______________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 09-cr-00279-1) 
District Judge: Honorable Richard P. Conaboy 
______________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2013 
______________ 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed: March 19, 2013) 
______________ 
 
OPINION 
______________ 
 
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge. 
 Thomas David Winebarger (“Winebarger”) challenges the sentence imposed by 
the District Court, arguing that the District Court erred by failing to apply the factors set 
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forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
1
  Since, as we explained in United States v. Winebarger, 
664 F.3d 388, 389 (3d Cir. 2011), the District Court could not consider the § 3553(a) 
factors in connection with the Government‟s motion filed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(e),
2
 we conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion and will affirm 
Winebarger‟s judgment of conviction.   
I.  Background 
 The facts underlying this case were set forth in detail in our prior opinion, which 
vacated Winebarger‟s sentence and remanded the case.  Winebarger, 664 F.3d at 390-92.  
We need not repeat them here.   
 On remand, the District Court resentenced Winebarger.  During the resentencing 
hearing, the Government provided support for its § 3553(e) motion.  Defense counsel 
then argued that, in addition to those points, the Court should consider the § 3553(a) 
factors, which counsel then discussed in detail.   
 After concluding that it could not consider the § 3553(a) factors based on our 
decision, the District Court accepted the Government‟s recommendation and imposed a 
sentence of 135 months, well below the statutory mandatory minimum of 180 months.   
                                                 
1
 Section 3553(a) sets forth various factors that district courts should consider 
when imposing sentence.   
 
2
 Section 3553(e) provides in relevant part that “[u]pon motion of the Government, 
the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by 
statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant‟s substantial assistance in the 
investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense.”  18 
U.S.C. § 3553(e). 
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II.  Analysis
3
 
 As he did before the District Court, Winebarger now argues that consideration of 
the § 3535(a) factors at his resentencing was appropriate where the Government moved 
for a sentence below the statutory minimum.  In light of our prior decision in this case, 
Winebarger‟s argument lacks merit.  In that opinion, we held “that the limited statutory 
authority granted by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) does not authorize a district court to reduce a 
sentence below a statutory minimum based on considerations unrelated to that 
defendant‟s substantial assistance to law enforcement authorities.”  Winebarger, 664 F.3d 
at 397.  We then set forth the procedure to follow in cases involving mandatory minimum 
sentences and § 3553(e) motions:   “the court . . . start[s] with the mandatory minimum 
sentence as a baseline and then, after granting the § 3553(e) motion,  . . . determine[s] the 
extent to which the defendant‟s cooperation warranted a divergence from that baseline.”  
Id.   
 We also noted that § 5K1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines “sets out an instructive, 
though not exhaustive, list of factors a sentencing court should examine when assessing 
that assistance and determining how far below a statutory minimum it will sentence a 
defendant pursuant to § 3553(e).”  Id.  We acknowledged that, pursuant to our decision in 
United States v. Casiano, 113 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1997), the extent of the departure could 
be reduced based on other factors not enumerated in § 3553(e) or Section 5K1.1.  
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have 
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However, those factors cannot increase the extent of the departure.  Winebarger, 664 F.3d 
at 397.  
 We review a district court‟s sentence in two stages:  first, we ensure that the 
district court committed no significant procedural error; second, we consider whether or 
not the sentence is substantively reasonable.  United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 
(3d Cir. 2009) (en banc).  In evaluating an appeal of a sentence, we review the District 
Court‟s sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion standard.  Gall v. United States, 
552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007); Tomko, 562 F.3d at 567.   
 On remand, the District Court carefully followed our instructions.  The Court 
started with the mandatory minimum sentence, granted the Government‟s § 3553(e) 
motion, and then determined the extent of the divergence warranted by Winebarger‟s 
assistance.  As such, the District Court committed no procedural error.  Similarly, we find 
that the District Court‟s sentence was substantively reasonable.  The Government 
explained Winebarger‟s assistance, as well as the increased danger to Winebarger in 
prison created by the publication of this Court‟s opinion.  Relying upon that 
representation, the District Court granted a reduction of sentence approximately 25% 
below the statutory mandatory minimum sentence.  We find that decision reasonable.   
 Winebarger‟s reliance on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), confuses 
the role of sentencing statutes and the Sentencing Guidelines.  Booker held that the 
Sentencing Guidelines are advisory; nowhere in that opinion did the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                                             
jurisdiction, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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suggest that sentencing statutes, properly enacted by Congress, are advisory.  In accord 
with this view, we have held that unlike the Sentencing Guidelines, which are advisory, 
statutorily established sentences are mandatory.  See, e.g., United States v. Reevey, 631 
F.3d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 2010) (“unlike the advisory sentencing guidelines range, „the 
statutory minimum drug trafficking penalty in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) . . . is mandatory‟” 
(quoting United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 248 (3d Cir. 2006))).
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III.  Conclusion 
 On remand, the District Court carefully followed our instructions and imposed a 
sentence that was both procedurally and substantively reasonable.  We find the Court did 
not abuse its discretion.  We will affirm the judgment of conviction.  
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  Similarly, Winebarger seeks to invoke the Supreme Court‟s pronouncement in 
Pepper v. United States, 131 S.Ct. 1229 (2011), to his advantage, but to no avail.  In 
Pepper, the Supreme Court affirmed the notion that, pursuant to both § 3661 and 
§ 3553(a), “a district court at resentencing may consider evidence of the defendant‟s 
postsentencing rehabilitation and that such evidence may, in appropriate cases, support a 
downward variance from the now-advisory Federal Sentencing Guidelines range.”  
Pepper, 131 S.Ct. at 1236.  This holding is a far cry from what Winebarger seeks to 
utilize here.  Pepper does not address statutory mandatory minimums.  As such, the 
holding of Pepper provides no solace here.   
